mcpward:给 MCP server 做黑盒契约与安全测试
原文标题:Show HN: Mcpward – black-box contract and security testing for MCP servers
mcpward 是一个对 MCP server 做黑盒契约与安全测试的工具,把 server 的契约快照进 lockfile,契约变化时让构建失败。
Treat an MCP server like any other external dependency: snapshot its contract, then fail the build when it changes underneath you. Black-box, so it works against servers you didn't write. Runs entirely on your machine — no account, no API calls, no telemetry.
Catches schema drift, silently changed tool descriptions, protocol violations, error-contract mistakes, and tool-poisoning patterns. Reports to console, JSON, JUnit, or SARIF.
Requirements
- Node.js ≥ 20
- An MCP server to test (stdio or HTTP transport)
Installation
Run without installing:
npx mcpward init
Or install globally:
npm install -g mcpward mcpward --version
Works against MCP servers written in any language, over stdio or Streamable HTTP.
Quick Start
# Initialize config npx mcpward init # Run all checks npx mcpward run # Capture baseline for drift detection npx mcpward baseline # Check for drift against baseline npx mcpward diff
Example Output
Pin the contract, then catch it changing.
$ mcpward baseline ✓ Connected to drift-server v1.0.0 ✓ Captured 6 tool(s) ✓ Baseline saved to mcpward.lock.json
The server ships an update. In CI:
$ mcpward diff DRIFT (5 failed) ✗ Tool "echo" description changed (possible rug-pull) ✗ Tool "compute" inputSchema added required property "multiplier" ✗ Tool "read_data" readOnlyHint changed from true to false (tool may now mutate state) ✗ Tool "removed_tool" was removed Summary: 2 passed | 5 failed $ echo $? 1
Four contract changes, none of which would surface at runtime until something broke.
How changes are classified
Not every change should fail a build. Adding an optional parameter is safe; adding a required one breaks existing callers. The classifier encodes this judgment as a pure function with exhaustive fixture-backed tests.
| Change | Classification | Severity | Fails by default? |
|---|---|---|---|
| Description changed | description_changed |
high | yes |
readOnlyHint true→false or destructiveHint false→true |
annotation_changed |
high | yes |
| Required field added / field removed / type narrowed / enum tightened / bound tightened / pattern added — at any depth | breaking_schema_change |
medium | yes |
| Output field removed / new output type / output format changed (inferred, opt-in) | breaking_output_shape_change |
medium | yes |
| Tool removed | tool_removed |
low | yes |
| Tool added | tool_added |
low | no |
| Optional field added / type widened / enum or bound loosened — at any depth | nonbreaking_schema_change |
low | no |
| Output field added (inferred, opt-in) | nonbreaking_output_shape_change |
low | no |
Severity is blast radius, not breakage. A removed tool is breaking but low: it fails loudly at the call site and gets fixed in minutes. A readOnlyHint flip is high: it silently changes what clients auto-approve, and nobody notices.
Concrete examples: A tool gains a new required multiplier parameter → breaking_schema_change (existing calls will fail). A tool adds an optional limit parameter → nonbreaking_schema_change (callers can ignore it). A parameter's type widens from string to string | number → nonbreaking_schema_change; narrowing the other way → breaking_schema_change. An enum loses a value, maxLength drops from 100 to 10, or filter.status gains a pattern → breaking_schema_change. A description — of the tool or of any parameter — gains one zero-width character → description_changed, and the diff shows it as <U+200B>.
Policy: choosing what fails CI
The fail_on setting is your policy engine. Fail on a severity threshold (recommended) or list the classes explicitly:
checks: drift: baseline: ./mcpward.lock.json fail_on: high # only silent security changes fail; schema breaks and removals report # fail_on: medium # high + schema/output breaks # fail_on: [tool_removed, description_changed, breaking_schema_change, annotation_changed] severity: # optional per-class overrides tool_removed: high
Some teams fail on any description change; others only on removals. Encode your tolerance here. See docs/rules.md for the full rule reference.
Output drift (opt-in)
Input drift breaks at the call site; output drift is silent until something downstream chokes. Many servers declare no outputSchema, so mcpward can infer each tool's output shape from real calls and diff the structure (fields, types, nesting — never values):
checks: drift: output: enabled: true shape_samples: 3 # calls per tool; shapes are merged, so optional fields aren't "missing" tools: # explicit allowlist, with arguments - name: get_order args: { id: "demo-1" }
This calls tools, so mcpward refuses to call anything that might have side effects: only tools annotated readOnlyHint: true that need no arguments are called automatically, plus whatever you allowlist. Every refused or skipped tool is reported with the reason.
Why mcpward?
Your agent calls tools/list and trusts whatever comes back. Tool descriptions are not documentation — they are the instructions the model reads to decide what a tool does. When a server you depend on ships an update, four things can change without any signal reaching you:
- a tool's description is rewritten (same name, same schema — nothing else catches this)
- a required parameter appears, and your existing calls start failing
readOnlyHintflips fromtruetofalse, so a tool you allow-listed can now mutate state- a tool disappears
mcpward pins the server's contract to a lockfile and fails your build when it drifts — the same discipline you already apply to every other dependency.
Security checks catch tool-poisoning patterns before they reach your agent:
SECURITY (9 failed)
✗ Tool "injection_tool" description contains injection-like pattern:
"Ignore all previous instructions"
✗ Tool "safetool" name contains hidden unicode: U+200B (zero-width)
✗ Tool "api_connector" schema solicits secrets: api_key, password
✗ Tool "delete_files" has readOnlyHint=true but name implies mutation
Where mcpward fits
MCP tooling splits into three jobs. Pick the one you actually have:
| Job | Use |
|---|---|
| Poke a server by hand and see what it does | MCP Inspector, MCPJam |
| Audit the servers installed on your machine for malicious behaviour | mcp-scan |
| Test a server as a dependency, in CI, and fail the build when its contract changes | mcpward |
Compared to mcp-scan
mcp-scan is excellent and considerably more mature — Invariant Labs' research is what named tool poisoning and rug pulls in MCP, and their tool-pinning has detected description changes via hashing since April 2025. If your question is "are the MCP servers installed on my machine safe?", use mcp-scan. It scans Claude, Cursor, and Windsurf configs, offers a proxy mode with live guardrails, and detects cross-origin escalation (tool shadowing), which mcpward does not do at all.
mcpward answers a different question: "did this server's contract change since my last release?"
| mcpward | mcp-scan | |
|---|---|---|
| Primary use | CI gate on a dependency | Audit your installed servers |
| Rug-pull / description drift | yes | yes |
| Tool-poisoning heuristics | yes | yes (stronger, research-backed) |
| Cross-origin escalation / tool shadowing | no | yes |
| Live proxy + runtime guardrails | no | yes |
| Protocol compliance checks | yes | no |
| Two-layer error contract | yes | no |
| Behavioral test suites | yes | no |
| Latency budgets | yes | no |
| JUnit + SARIF for CI | yes | no |
| Runs fully offline, no data leaves your machine | yes | ** shares tool names and descriptions with invariantlabs.ai ** |
That last row is the practical reason to reach for mcpward on internal or client-owned servers: nothing leaves your machine. No account, no API key, no service to trust.
Compared to other CI-oriented tools
| Feature | mcpward | mcpvet | MCP-Contract-CI |
|---|---|---|---|
| Description-level drift | yes | no | no |
| Schema drift detection | yes | yes | yes |
| Breaking vs non-breaking classification | yes | partial | yes |
| Protocol compliance | yes | yes | no |
| Two-layer error contract | yes | no | no |
| Tool-poisoning heuristics | yes | no | no |
| SARIF export | yes | no | no |
| JUnit output | yes | yes | no |
| Behavioral test suites | yes | no | yes |
| Latency budgets | yes | no | no |
| HTTP transport | yes | yes | no |
Description collisions are caught on first contact, with no baseline. Two tools with near-identical descriptions but different payloads — one takes a nested filter object, the other a flat status string — make an agent pick confidently and wrong, and no success/error check can see it. mcpward flags a pair only when the descriptions are near-identical and the input schemas diverge, so ordinary tool families like list_users / list_projects stay silent. Similarity is computed offline; no model or API calls.
Two-layer error contract deserves a note, because nothing else checks it. MCP distinguishes protocol errors (a JSON-RPC error object) from tool errors (a successful result carrying isError: true). A tool that fails its job should return the second, not the first. Servers get this backwards routinely, and it changes how a client must handle the failure.
Features
- Classifies every schema change as breaking or non-breaking — fails CI only on the ones you configure, reports the rest
- Detects description rewrites (rug-pulls) — hashes canonicalized descriptions and shows a word-level diff with invisible characters marked
- Ranks drift by blast radius — high/medium/low severity,
fail_on: highto fail only on silent security changes - Catches tool-poisoning patterns — injection phrasing, hidden unicode (including Unicode Tag "ASCII smuggling", decoded for you), secret-soliciting schemas, annotation mismatches — in tool and parameter descriptions
- Lints description collisions — near-identical descriptions over divergent schemas, no baseline needed
- Detects output shape drift — inferred from real (read-only or allowlisted) calls, structure only
- Validates error contracts — verifies servers use protocol errors vs tool errors correctly (unique to mcpward)
- Runs behavioral test suites — declarative cases with JSONPath assertions against tool outputs
- Enforces latency budgets — fails when p95 exceeds your threshold
- stdio and Streamable HTTP — identical results over both transports, tested for parity; paginated
tools/listis read in full - Outputs JUnit, SARIF, JSON and Markdown — plus an opt-in PR comment that updates in place
- Works fully offline — no accounts, no API calls, nothing leaves your machine (the PR comment talks only to your own GitHub API, and only when you enable it)
See docs/rules.md for every check mcpward performs and what each finding means.
Configuration
Create mcpward.yaml:
server: transport: stdio command: npx args: ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem", "/tmp/sandbox"] env: {} timeouts: connect_ms: 10000 # Connection timeout (default: 10s) call_ms: 30000 # Per-tool-call timeout (default: 30s) run_ms: 300000 # Total run timeout (default: 5min) checks: compliance: true schema: true security: true drift: baseline: ./mcpward.lock.json fail_on: high # or medium / low, or a list of drift classes severity: {} # per-class overrides, e.g. { tool_removed: high } full_text: true # store description text in the lockfile for diffs output: # output shape drift — opt-in, calls tools enabled: false shape_samples: 3 call_readonly: true # auto-call readOnlyHint tools that take no arguments tools: [] # allowlist: [{ name: get_order, args: { id: "demo-1" } }] collision: # description collision lint — on by default enabled: true threshold: 0.8 # description similarity (0–1) max_tools: 500 # skip with a warning above this (pairwise is O(n²)) fail: false # true = collisions fail the run instead of warning latency: samples: 5 p95_budget_ms: 1000 suites: - tool: read_file cases: - name: reads an existing file args: { path: "/tmp/sandbox/hello.txt" } expect: tool_is_error: false jsonpath: "$.content[0].type": "text" - name: returns error for missing file args: { path: "/nonexistent" } expect: tool_is_error: true
Environment Variables
Use ${ENV_VAR} syntax for secrets:
server: transport: http url: https://example.com/mcp headers: Authorization: "Bearer ${MCP_TOKEN}"
Behavioral Test Expectations
| Option | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
tool_is_error |
boolean | Assert the tool response has isError: true/false |
protocol_error_code |
number | Assert a JSON-RPC error code (e.g., -32602) |
jsonpath |
object | Assert values at JSONPath locations |
output_matches_schema |
boolean | Validate output against tool's outputSchema |
golden |
string | Path (relative to the config file) to a golden snapshot of the tool's output. A missing file fails; create or refresh it with mcpward run --update-golden. Deterministic tools only. |
Check Families
Compliance
| Check | Description |
|---|---|
compliance/handshake |
Protocol handshake completed |
compliance/protocol-version |
Valid protocol version negotiated |
compliance/server-info |
Server name and version present |
compliance/capabilities |
Server declares capabilities |
compliance/ping |
Server responds to ping |
Schema
| Check | Description |
|---|---|
schema/tool-name |
Names match ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$ |
schema/tool-description |
Non-empty descriptions |
schema/tool-input-schema |
Valid JSON Schema |
schema/tool-annotations |
Valid annotation values |
schema/unique-names |
No duplicate names |
Security
| Check | Description |
|---|---|
security/injection-pattern |
Injection-like phrasing in descriptions |
security/hidden-unicode |
Zero-width, bidirectional, or Unicode Tag (ASCII smuggling) characters in names, descriptions, or parameter descriptions |
security/secret-in-schema |
Schema fields soliciting secrets |
security/annotation-mismatch |
readOnlyHint on destructive tools |
Drift
See How changes are classified for the full classification table and policy configuration.
Collision
| Check | Description |
|---|---|
collision/description-collision |
Near-identical descriptions over divergent input schemas (required-param types or nesting depth differ) |
collision/summary |
Pairs checked, or skipped above max_tools |
Behavioral
| Check | Description |
|---|---|
behavioral/tool-is-error |
Assert isError matches expectation |
behavioral/jsonpath |
Assert values at JSONPath locations |
behavioral/output-schema |
Validate output against schema |
behavioral/protocol-error |
Assert protocol error codes |
Latency
| Check | Description |
|---|---|
latency/summary |
Overall p50/p95 vs budget |
latency/tool |
Per-tool latency measurements |
CI Integration
GitHub Actions
# Basic usage - name: Run mcpward run: npx mcpward run # JUnit output for test results - name: Run with JUnit output run: npx mcpward run --reporter junit --out results.xml - name: Upload test results uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4 with: name: mcpward-results path: results.xml # SARIF output for GitHub Security tab - name: Run with SARIF output run: npx mcpward run --reporter sarif --out results.sarif - name: Upload SARIF to GitHub Security uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3 with: sarif_file: results.sarif
Findings appear in the repository's Security → Code scanning tab, with rule descriptions and remediation guidance from docs/rules.md.
# Using the mcpward action - name: Run mcpward uses: TsvetanG2/mcpward/action@main with: config: mcpward.yaml reporter: junit output: results.xml
PR comment
Post the classified report — drift with severity, before/after description diffs, collisions — as a pull request comment. Re-runs update the same comment instead of stacking new ones; outside a pull request it does nothing.
permissions: contents: read pull-requests: write jobs: mcpward: runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps: - uses: actions/checkout@v4 - uses: TsvetanG2/mcpward/action@main with: config: mcpward.yaml pr-comment: true
Without the action: GITHUB_TOKEN=${{ github.token }} npx mcpward run --pr-comment. The comment is rendered from the same redacted report as every other reporter, and all server-supplied text is escaped so a malicious tool description cannot inject links, HTML, or @-mentions into your PR.
The same Markdown works as a job summary: npx mcpward run --reporter markdown --out "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY".
Exit Codes
| Code | Meaning |
|---|---|
0 |
All checks passed |
1 |
One or more checks failed |
2 |
Configuration or connection error, or timeouts.run_ms exceeded — nothing (or not everything) was tested |
The distinction between 1 and 2 matters: 2 means the run never completed, which should be treated differently from a genuine failure.
Machine-readable formats
The JSON report, the config file and the baseline lockfile each have a published JSON Schema, shipped in the npm package under schemas/:
| File | Schema | Version field |
|---|---|---|
JSON report (--reporter json) |
schemas/report.v1.schema.json |
schemaVersion |
mcpward.yaml |
schemas/config.v1.schema.json |
— |
| Baseline lockfile | schemas/lockfile.v2.schema.json |
meta.schemaVersion |
mcpward init adds a yaml-language-server comment so editors validate and autocomplete mcpward.yaml. What is (and is not) covered by compatibility guarantees is described in docs/stability.md.
Roadmap
- Registry-published tool-surface hashes — verify a server against a hash published by its registry, once registries publish them (#21)
- Opt-in semantic scorer for the collision lint — a local embedding model or bring-your-own endpoint behind the existing scorer interface; the offline lexical scorer stays the default
- Constraint-level schema analysis — detect narrowed
maxItems, removedenumvalues, and other JSON Schema constraint changes (currently property-level only) - Supply chain / server identity — the contract pins tool names and schemas, not the implementation; capturing binary or container digest alongside the contract is a future direction
Development
pnpm install
pnpm run build
pnpm run test
pnpm run lintLicense
MIT
来源:Hacker News · MCP · github.com